Remembering Wasicka’s Call-or-Fold Dilemma

Poker-wise, today -- August 10 -- has several significances. It’s Doyle Brunson’s birthday today. Kara Scott, Ed Miller, and John Hennigan are also celebrating birthdays today, I believe.

Meanwhile, it was on this date in 2006 that the final table of the World Series of Main Event played out, the one in which Jamie Gold won what is still the largest first prize ever in a WSOP Main Event of $12 million.

Was thinking back a little today to that final table -- the first WSOP ME to play out after I’d started Hard-Boiled Poker about three months before.

I have an article over on PokerNews today focusing in particular on the wild three-way hand that resulted in Michael Binger finishing third and Paul Wasicka making one of the most talked-about folds in WSOP history (before eventually finishing second). Those who remember the hand might find it interesting to relive it briefly. And if you don’t recall the hand, check out the incredibly tough spot in which Wasicka found himself.

The article appears under the heading “Hand Histories,” and I’m kind of thinking of occasionally writing about other famous poker hands in history, in particular ones that highlight an especially interesting strategic decision. Will try to avoid the same old stuff with these, but rather invite readers to hone in on a moment -- like Wasicka’s decision -- and share their thinking about it.

What other hands might work well for “Hand Histories”? Let me know -- I’m all ears.

Physicists & Poker

You might have heard something last week about an article in the November issue of Discover magazine about physicists and poker. The article is titled “Big Game Theory” and is by Jennifer Ouelette. You can read it online by clicking here. There was also an NPR segment on the article over the weekend, which you can access by clicking here.

I happen to have a particular interest in this subject. While I never studied physics too intensely -- only had a couple of classes that didn’t really take me beyond an introduction to the subject -- my father is in fact a physicist, and as a result I’ve always been somewhat curious about some of the many areas of inquiry physicists pursue.

What was it like being raised by a physicist? Well, I used to joke about how Dad didn’t mind me watching the Wile E. Coyote-Road Runner cartoons as a kid, but simply could not let me see the coyote run off the side of a cliff, hang in mid-air for a few seconds and perhaps hold up a sign, then drop from the sky leaving a puff of smoke behind without delivering an explanation of the impossibility of such applesauce.

The joke (only partially embellished from the truth, I maintain) perhaps suggests something about how physicists see the world around them -- namely, as a place where explanations really do exist for most physical phenomena. Some of these explanations, such as why a coyote can’t hang in the air like that, are not difficult to discover. Others are less obvious, but even there the physicist will pursue acceptable methods of inquiry in the effort to discover such explanations.

That’s the idea -- of the physicist being a puzzle-solving, rational interpreter of the world -- Ouelette advances in her article, her main point being to suggest that such a mindset appears to be especially well-suited to poker.

“Perhaps poker appeals to physicists because it is an intricate, complex puzzle,” writes Ouelette, noting how poker is “steeped in statistical probabilities and the tenets of game theory.” Since it often turns out that “the best players evince a rare combination of skills in math, strategy, and psychology,” it isn’t that surprising to find a number of physicists doing well at the tables.

Ouelette refers to Michael Binger, perhaps the best-known and most successful poker-playing physicist, whom you’ll recall finished third at the 2006 WSOP Main Event behind Jamie Gold and Paul Wasicka. She also makes reference to a few others, including Michael Piper and Liv Boeree, while also mentioning Chris Ferguson who has a Ph.D. in computer science.

She additionally spoke with the Dutch player Marcel Vonk, another physicist who won a WSOP bracelet in an event I happened to cover this summer, Event No. 54, the last of the $1,000 buy-in no-limit hold’em events. As the tournament reached the final stages, we became aware of his background in physics and his website. I wrote a little about Vonk’s background in a post here back in July.

Vonk certainly played well in that event, although experienced some good fortune, too -- including during heads-up play versus the strong David Peters -- on his way to conquering the 3,844-player field.

Vonk confirms Ouelette’s suggestion that those who become physicists may in fact be especially well-suited for poker.

“The skills required are similar,” says Vonk, noting that they include “mathematical abilities,” being able to “spot patterns and predict things from them,” and “patience” to keep working at difficult problems that may take multiple attempts to solve.

The article goes on to make a few more points that most poker players will find familiar. It’s good to know probabilities, but one shouldn’t get too carried away with emphasizing the “math” of the game. Poker is a game of “incomplete information,” so we can’t perfectly calculate everything, anyway. And bad beats or “statistical anomalies” will happen, something any physicist worth his credentials well understands.

All in all, an interesting piece that makes some decent observations. The only deficit I can see -- beyond the fact that Ouelette is really only scratching the surface of this subject -- is her suggestion that poker tourneys began to “flourish” in the 1970s when “thousands of how-to books” appeared. (About three decades off there, I’d say.)

I say she’s only scratching the surface -- indeed, the article only represents a small portion of the writing and research she did. Over on the “Cocktail Party Physics” website, Ouelette has additionally published a lengthy blog post, titled “Physicists Put on Their Poker Face,” in which she shares a great deal more from her piece that didn’t make the final cut -- more discussion of probability and game theory, more quotes from her interviewees, etc.

I will have to send these links along to my Dad the physicist and see what he thinks about them. Maybe reading these pieces will get him wanting to play poker with me.

However, for my sake I might be better off avoiding getting involved in a game with him. Might well end up like this:

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 229: Split Decision

Okay, one more. All in all, ESPN’s pay-per-view was well done, I’d say. I can’t imagine sitting through the whole thing live, but watching it this way -- in easier-to-digest segments, after the fact -- has been a treat. In fact, as this here post exceeds all reasonable guidelines for length, let me suggest you approach it similarly. Don’t feel obligated to read all at once . . . take it in small chunks, if needed. The discussion comes in three parts: (1) a description of the action; (2) an attempt to assess one of the player’s decisions using game theory; (3) a last reflection.

I. The Action

This is the last hand to feature three players. Jamie Gold has 63,425,000 in chips. Paul Wasicka has 13,325,000. Michael Binger has 12,650,000. The blinds are still 200,000/400,000 (with the 50,000 ante). We watch the action from the bird’s-eye view of the overhead camera. Not following Jesus’s advice for playing the button while three-handed (described in the previous post), Gold limps from the button from over on the right-hand side of the table. On the left, Wasicka calls from the small blind. Binger -- in the middle -- puts in a raise of 1.5 million. Gold pauses and calls Binger’s raise. We are shown a lengthy close-up of Wasicka riffling his chips as he decides what to do. We hear Wasicka speaking. “You can’t have a hand every single time, Jamie . . . Jeez.” About twenty seconds go by, and Wasicka makes the call. The pot is 4,650,000.

“And here’s the flop,” calls out the tournament announcer -- . Wasicka very deliberately taps the felt with an extended finger. Phil Gordon points out how “it wasn’t an instant check . . . he did study it.” Binger reaches forward and pushes in a healthy 3,500,000 chip bet. Close to half of Binger’s chips are now in the pot, so he’s likely committed to go all the way here. Before he can even bring his hands back to his sides, Gold waves back-handedly and says “I’m all-in.”

Wasicka immediately groans and stands up from the table, obviously less than thrilled with Gold’s move. “This is sick,” he says through gritted teeth. Gold loudly cries out “This is it, guys!” “This is sick,” repeats Wasicka. “We all got a hand, let’s do it,” says Gold. “Let’s go all three . . . let’s get it over with, right now.”

Wasicka is fit to be tied. “Are you kidding me?” he says to no one in particular, sitting down and reexamining his cards. He stands again and asks Binger how much he has bet. Gold interrupts saying it doesn’t matter because he’s all-in, but Wasicka objects and Gold backs off. A moment passes and Wasicka again voices his displeasure. “This is disgusting,” he says. Gold nods as if in agreement. His nod evolves into a goose-like bobbing action, then he stands upright and claps his hands. Wasicka folds and Binger instantly calls.

Binger has for top-pair, top-kicker. Gold has for an open-ended straight draw. Gold claps his hands, then shakes Binger’s hand and wishes him good luck. Gordon announces Gold has eight outs, but soon we learn that he actually only has seven. “Paul, You didn’t have the best hand, did you?” Gold calls across the table. “I had the seven-eight of spades,” answers Wasicka. He has folded an open-ended straight flush draw. “Wow,” says Gordon. “I don’t know how you can fold that hand.”

The pot is 26,800,000. “Gimme a spade, at least,” asks Gold. The turn comes -- the . Even better. Gold is hugging Johnny Chan. And Binger is drawing dead.

Binger is smiling and very gracious. He tells a friend he’s curious to see what the river card is, and whether it would have helped Wasicka beat him (if Gold had stayed out of the pot). He walks over to Wasicka and they shake hands. “It’s been a pleasure, man,” says Wasicka. “I’m curious if I would’ve beaten your hand,” says Binger. He’s thinking about what would’ve happened if he had gone all-in first. Would Gold have folded? (Probably not.) If Gold had folded, would Wasicka have called him? “I probably would’ve,” says Wasicka. “One of us has to take [chips], you know.” The now-meaningless river card comes -- . Wasicka would’ve made his flush.

Wasicka wanders around the table with a half-smirk, half-grin on his face as Harrah’s officials set the stage for heads-up play. Within seven hands, Gold will take the rest of the chips (between scoops of blueberries).

II. Wasicka’s decision

Gold’s all-in was bold. It is probably safe to say it altered the outcome of the hand. It arguably sealed his victory for the tournament as well. If Wasicka had made the call with his straight-flush draw, he would’ve won the hand and had around 38 million chips -- not too far from half of the chips in play. Let's forget about that spade on the river for a moment. Should he have called?

If we are talking strictly pot odds, the answer is yes. He need to put 12 million in to win a pot of nearly 27 million -- that’s 3.25-to-1. With a whopping 15 outs for the turn and the river, he’s looking at better than 2-to-1 to hit a winner. If this were a cash game, calling would be a no-brainer.

But this ain’t no cash game. If he calls and wins, terrific. However, if he calls and Gold still wins the hand, the tournament ends right there with Wasicka finishing in second place (since he began the hand with more chips than Binger). If Wasicka calls and Binger wins the hand, he will either be left with 675,000 chips (if his hand beats Gold’s), or will be out right there in third place (if Gold’s hand beats his) -- either way, he’s very likely destined to finish third. So calling could end well or disastrously. But folding also is something of a risk. Folding means either assuring himself at least second place or becoming the short stack by a fairly large margin (he’d be about 15 million behind Binger).

Put yourself in Wasicka’s position. What would you do?

How about this. Let’s say everyone was allowed to turn their cards face up after Gold went all-in. Now put yourself in Wasicka’s position. Let’s say you were even allowed to use CardPlayer's Texas Hold ’em Calculator. You know you’re 53.82% to win the hand. You know Binger is 29.01% to win. You know Gold is 17.17% to win. What would you do?

Here’s where we might actually use some of that game theory stuff we keep hearing people like Chris "Jesus" Ferguson answering questions about but most of us never really pay much heed. (If numbers ain’t yr bag, save yourself some grief and skip now to section III.)

Let’s say you make the call. Over half the time you end up heads-up with nearly half the chips. Let’s also say if that were to occur, you’d have a 50-50 chance of winning the whole ball of wax. About a third of the time you will either finish in third right here or within the next hand or so. Another 1/6 of the time you’ll finish in second place right here. So by calling . . .

-- 27% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $6 million (after losing a heads-up battle or after busting out right here in second)
-- 30% of the time you win $4 million (after busting out right here or soon afterwards in third)

Let’s say you fold. Once you’ve folded, Binger is about 65% to win and Gold 35%. (I can’t be precise here, but that’s about where it stands given Gold has seven available outs plus the backdoor flush draw.) Let’s also say that if Binger wins the hand, 2/3 of the time you’ll end up playing for awhile and getting bounced out in third place. (I say that because he’d have a bit over twice your chips.) And if Gold wins (as happened), let’s make you a 6-to-1 dog to overcome the huge chip lead and somehow win. (I say that because Gold has over 6 times Wasicka’s chips when heads-up begins.) In other words, by folding . . .

-- 5% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 52% of the time you win $6 million (after outlasting Binger and making it to second or after watching Binger lose here and then eventually losing a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $4 million (eventually busting out in third)

Which is the better decision? Isn’t it obvious? (Ha ha.)

Knowing what we know, calling is going to be the more profitable play here. Let’s say we play out this scenario 200 times and we call 100 times and fold 100 times. The 100 times we call, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 27 times = $324 million.
Win $6 million 43 times = $258 million.
Win $4 million 30 times = $120 million.
TOTAL = $702 million or an average of $7.02 million each time.

The 100 times we fold, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 5 times = $60 million.
Win $6 million 52 times = $312 million.
Win $4 million 43 times = $172 million.
TOTAL = $544 million or an average of $5.44 million each time.

Thus, between the two choices, calling is clearly going to be more profitable than folding. So says game theory, anyway . . . .

III. Final thoughts

To be fair to Wasicka, this here experiment assumes full knowledge of everyone’s cards and all of the relevant percentages. Not precisely what happened in real life, to be sure. However, I think it is safe to say Wasicka pretty much knew where he stood when he made the decision. He knew how many chips everyone had. And he knew that all 15 of his outs were probably good. (He could’ve feared a higher spade draw, but I’d be willing to bet that possibility really didn't affect his thinking too greatly when he made his decision to fold.) [EDIT (added 9/18/06): Listening to Wasicka on CardPlayer's The Circuit this week, I discovered that, in fact, he was worried Gold was on a higher flush draw here! So I'd have lost that bet.] So even without knowing that the spade came on the river, Gordon was probably right when he suggested calling was the play to make here.

While it's doubtful Wasicka had all of this worked out to the nearest hundredth of a percentage point, he still knew (I'd argue) that he probably should call. And that he probably wasn’t going to. That’s why he is repeating how “sick” and “disgusting” the situation is. We’ve all been there (though never for these stakes). We know know know what is right, but we just can’t act on that knowledge and the pull the trigger.

In the final hand of the tournament, Wasicka did pull the trigger and make the call of an all-in. Only this time Gold had him beat. As I mentioned before, I’m gonna leave that hand to others to decipher. Watch it here, if you want. Meanwhile, for anyone who’s made it all the way through this monster of a post, it’s been a pleasure . . . .

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 218: Honest Abe

Was over on Full Tilt Poker this afternoon and realized there were more playing that $200/$400 Omaha Hi-Lo game (twelve players, including Allen Cunningham) than $0.50/$1.00 limit hold’em (eight players, including your humble servant). Starting to think FTP is a great site for watching, but not so hot for playing . . . at least if yr a short-stack like me. (Ranted about this circumstance once before, actually.)

Speaking of watching poker . . . I have two more hands from the WSOP Main Event Final Table to talk about. I see that ESPN’s edited version of the Main Event has made it through day four so far (six episodes down, six to go). Not sure when exactly they’ll be getting to the final table, but I’ll probably take a peek to see some hole cards on a few of these hands.

By the time we get to this particular hand, they were down to Jamie Gold (nearly 62 million), Paul Wasicka (about 16 million), and Michael Binger (around 12.5 million). The mood around the table has lightened considerably since Cunningham went out. It’s about 3 a.m., so they’ve been at it for eleven hours or so, minus the breaks. Chris “Jesus” Ferguson is now in the booth with Ali Nejad and Phil Gordon answering questions about three-handed play. Ends up delivering a mini-sermon here on the subject. And it was good.

What would Jesus do? Well he’d never limp from the button. Rather, when on the button, he says to raise half the time and fold the other half. He says definitely play any king or ace. When in the small blind, he says to call a third of the time, fold a third of the time, and raise a third of the time.

On Hand No. 217, Gold had raised to 1 million from the button. (The blinds are still 200,000/400,000 with a 50,000 chip ante.) Wasicka folded in the small blind, then Binger moved all-in from the big blind. Instead of deciding on his own what to do next, Gold asked Binger what he wanted him to do.

“It’s fifty-fifty,” Gold explains. “You wanna go all-in fifty-fifty? You tell me . . . call or fold.” Binger smiles nervously. “I don’t know what you have,” he says. “I’m telling you, I don’t have much,” Gold replies. “If I had a big hand, I’d call you in five seconds.” Gold is grinning from ear to ear. Binger asks him “You have a pair or an ace?” Gold slowly blinks, saying “I don’t have a pair.” Finally, after some more hem-and-hawing, Binger says he can’t tell Gold what to do. Gold nods and tosses his cards into the muck.

As the cards are dealt for Hand No. 218, Nejad confidently suggests “Michael Binger is showing that he is unafraid of Jamie Gold.” Nejad is dead wrong, of course. Anyone paying even a little bit of attention can see Binger just now demonstrating that he’s very afraid of Jamie Gold. The man has him outchipped five-to-one, and Binger has little desire to tangle with the chip leader when the difference between second and third place is two million clams.

Binger also seems to be having difficulty figuring out what Gold has from how he’s playing. Case in point: Hand No. 218.

The action moves fairly quickly here until we get to the river. Wasicka folds on the button, Binger raises to 1 million from the SB, and Gold calls from the BB. The flop is . Binger checks, Gold casually throws out a minimum bet of 400,000, and Binger calls. The pot is 2,950,000. The turn is the and both players quickly check. The river is the . Binger checks and Gold casually stacks twelve green chips and pushes them in the middle -- a bet of 1,200,000.

“Ten and jack?” quickly asks Binger. Gold appears amused at the question. He smiles and exhales. There is absolutely zero chance he has a straight here. “I’ll show ya,” says Gold. Binger looks up at the dealer and asks “Can he show me before I make my decision?” The table shares a chuckle.

Then Gold actually flips one card over quickly, briefly exposing it before turning it back down. Binger leans forward in an exaggerated gesture, asking “What was that?’ “I dunno,” Gold shrugs. “Was that the jack of diamonds?” says Binger.

“He can’t do that,” says Gordon. “If the tournament director sees him do that, that is a ten-minute penalty.” The commentators will continue to discuss the violation for the next couple of hands, and while Gold is never assessed any penalty, it ultimately matters very little. Sitting out ten minutes at this juncture would’ve caused Gold to miss at most four or five hands, perhaps six if Binger and Wasicka agreed to fold each hand immediately after it was dealt. That’s two orbits or so -- at most a 1.5 million chip hit to Gold’s massive stack, probably evenly divided between the two short stacks. Not a factor.

The subsequent exchange between Gold and Binger is one of the better examples of table talk in the whole broadcast.

Gold: “You wanna donate, donate.”
Binger: “I’m thinking about it.”
Gold: “I’m probably bluffing, man.”
Binger: “I know.”
Gold: “1.2 million, man . . . . Put it in . . . .”

In the booth, Ferguson says “The bet actually does smell a lot like a bluff.” Gordon agrees. “He’s been Honest Abe so far when he’s talking at the table,” Nejad chimes in.

Binger: “Aye-yi-yi.” (He slaps his hand to his forehead.)
Gold: “I bet small enough so you can call. Then you’ll see my hand.”

Binger takes a moment to calculate pot odds and then compute what percentage of the time Gold would have to be bluffing to justify a call here. You know what I’m talking about. That piece of mental calisthenics you read about in Harrington on Hold ’em but have yet really to implement in your game. The pot is nearly 3 million. Gold bet 1.2 million, so Binger is looking at about 3.5-to-1 odds to call. As Harrington explains, that means Binger needs to be right only once every 4.5 times he calls here to break even. As Binger himself finally concludes, “if you’re bluffing like 20-30% of the time, I gotta call.” “So you’re priced in,” says Gold. “Here you go. Let’s call. Get it over with. You’ll see my hand . . . and . . . rock ‘n roll! I’ll show you either way.”

Binger continues to deliberate. “You got me,” Gold finally confesses. “C’mon!”

Binger folds and Gold immediately shows his . Jack-high. In other words, jack squat.

“Aaaaaugghhh,” cries Binger, doing a nice imitation of Charlie Brown just after Lucy pulls the football away. Again.

[EDIT (added 9/28/06): The hole card cameras on ESPN's edited version of the final table show us Binger indeed folded the best hand -- .]

Binger shakes his head, takes a swig from his water bottle, slaps the padded table edge, and tells Gold good hand. “I told you you got me,” says Gold. “I’m having fun. Easy for me to say, with a stack like this . . . .”

Gold’s having fun, all right. So is the viewer. (Good thing, too, since the outcome has been all but decided.) A great example, really, of where the live broadcast beats the edited version.

Okay, one more hand (Hand No. 229) and we can get on with our lives. Meanwhile, I’ll be railing that crazy Omaha Hi-Lo game on FTP . . . .

Photo: “The first 1953 $5 Silver Certificate printed (Smithsonian)” (inset), National Museum of American History. Public Domain.

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 60: Riding the Rush?

Before reaching that huge hand between Jamie Gold and Richard Lee I found one other interesting hand involving two of the short stacks. Figures I would. To paraphrase a Chandler short story title, shorts stacks is my business.

On the prior hand, Michael Binger had doubled up through Allen Cunningham thanks to a fortunate draw. Down to about 3 million (7th out of 7), Binger had raised to 700,000 UTG. (The blinds at this level were 100,000/200,000 with a 30,000 ante.) It folded around to Cunningham who called from the big blind. Cunningham checked the QJ8 flop, Binger moved all-in, and Cunningham called with ace-queen. Binger had ace-ten, and luckily for him a king came on the turn, filling his gutshot.

Now comes Hand No. 60. Binger is now the big blind, and his 6 million puts him in 5th place. At this point the seven players have essentially divided into upper and lower divisions, with Gold (37 million), Richard Lee (20 million), and Cunningham (11.5 million) all with large stacks and Douglas Kim, Binger, Rhett Butler, and Paul Wasicka all with short stacks (from 3 to 7 million).

As the hand begins, we watch from overhead as Binger carefully stacks his new chips into a symmetrical arrangement. Doyle Brunson is in the booth answering questions about the H.O.R.S.E. event. It folds around to Paul Wasicka on the button. Wasicka looks at his cards and spends twenty seconds or so counting out part of his chips before announcing he’s all-in. Cunningham folds in the small blind and the action is on Binger.

Binger looks at his cards and it is immediately apparent that whatever he has, he’s not ready to fold it instantly. He scratches his forehead and looks worriedly over in Wasicka’s direction. He rubs his eyes and audibly exhales. He momentarily bends forward and covers both ears with the palms of his hands. In short, he looks like a poor sap who has finally gotten up the gumption to ask his best girl to marry him and she just said let me think about it . . . .

In all, Binger deliberates about 30 seconds or so before finally saying “I call” and turning over his hand -- . Wasicka turns over , and Binger says “damn,” grimacing and shaking his head as if he’s trying to undo what he’s just done. “I can’t believe the ace-nine called here, do you, Doyle?” asks Gordon. (Brunson later says he’d rather have two face cards in that spot, “’cause the other guy figgers to have an ace.”) Nejad correctly notes that even if Wasicka didn’t have an ace here, Binger wouldn’t have been that big of a favorite against any two random cards. All agree the call was a major miscalculation by Binger.

The board comes , and Wasicka has doubled up to 6.7 million or so. Meanwhile Binger has landed right back where he was two hands earlier, in last place with less than 3 million.

Is there any defense for Binger’s play here? Perhaps not. I’ll offer what I think might be a partial explanation, though . . . .

When Wasicka moved all-in from the button, it was the fifth time he’d made a large preflop raise from late position (always from the button or the cutoff). That’s out of eight orbits or so. Binger is in the small blind when Wasicka is in the cutoff seat and in the big blind when Wasicka is on the button, thus making Binger acutely aware of what Wasicka has been doing. Having lost his blinds four times already, Binger had probably already thought to himself that the next time Wasicka pulled that move and he had any kind of hand at all, he’d consider looking him up. The fact that he had just doubled his stack perhaps made him even more eager to entertain the idea (since prior to Hand no. 59 he and Wasicka had been essentially even in chips the entire evening).

I really don’t think Binger was “riding the rush” here and acted recklessly after winning his first big pot of the night. No, I think his call was very likely at least somewhat premeditated. Of course, A9-offsuit is hardly the ideal hand with which for him to have made this play. But we’ve all been there . . . you’ve picked up an opponent’s betting pattern and have convinced yourself precisely how best to exploit it, but when the opportunity comes around certain factors (e.g., other players’ actions, your starting hand, what happened the hand before, etc.) compromise the play. All in all, I’m not faulting Binger too terribly here. Think how hard it would be to make correct decisions with all the various pressures (the money, the cameras, etc.). How’s it go? Living on a lighted stage approaches the unreal for those who think and feel . . . ?

Also worth noting here is how smartly Wasicka appears to have played his short stack during the latter stages of the tourney. Recall he was the player who began day 7 (the next-to-last day) way down in 24th place (out of 27) and managed to claw his way to the final table. While Gold’s successful handling of the big stack is getting most of the attention, Wasicka’s short-stack play during the last two days of the tourney is probably also worth some praise. (I believe I’ve read somewhere how Wasicka somehow managed never once to call a river bet at the final table, but I haven’t checked that out.)

Hand No. 122 coming up.

Image: Rush, Moving Pictures (1981) (adapted), Amazon.