Remembering Wasicka’s Call-or-Fold Dilemma

Poker-wise, today -- August 10 -- has several significances. It’s Doyle Brunson’s birthday today. Kara Scott, Ed Miller, and John Hennigan are also celebrating birthdays today, I believe.

Meanwhile, it was on this date in 2006 that the final table of the World Series of Main Event played out, the one in which Jamie Gold won what is still the largest first prize ever in a WSOP Main Event of $12 million.

Was thinking back a little today to that final table -- the first WSOP ME to play out after I’d started Hard-Boiled Poker about three months before.

I have an article over on PokerNews today focusing in particular on the wild three-way hand that resulted in Michael Binger finishing third and Paul Wasicka making one of the most talked-about folds in WSOP history (before eventually finishing second). Those who remember the hand might find it interesting to relive it briefly. And if you don’t recall the hand, check out the incredibly tough spot in which Wasicka found himself.

The article appears under the heading “Hand Histories,” and I’m kind of thinking of occasionally writing about other famous poker hands in history, in particular ones that highlight an especially interesting strategic decision. Will try to avoid the same old stuff with these, but rather invite readers to hone in on a moment -- like Wasicka’s decision -- and share their thinking about it.

What other hands might work well for “Hand Histories”? Let me know -- I’m all ears.

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 229: Split Decision

Okay, one more. All in all, ESPN’s pay-per-view was well done, I’d say. I can’t imagine sitting through the whole thing live, but watching it this way -- in easier-to-digest segments, after the fact -- has been a treat. In fact, as this here post exceeds all reasonable guidelines for length, let me suggest you approach it similarly. Don’t feel obligated to read all at once . . . take it in small chunks, if needed. The discussion comes in three parts: (1) a description of the action; (2) an attempt to assess one of the player’s decisions using game theory; (3) a last reflection.

I. The Action

This is the last hand to feature three players. Jamie Gold has 63,425,000 in chips. Paul Wasicka has 13,325,000. Michael Binger has 12,650,000. The blinds are still 200,000/400,000 (with the 50,000 ante). We watch the action from the bird’s-eye view of the overhead camera. Not following Jesus’s advice for playing the button while three-handed (described in the previous post), Gold limps from the button from over on the right-hand side of the table. On the left, Wasicka calls from the small blind. Binger -- in the middle -- puts in a raise of 1.5 million. Gold pauses and calls Binger’s raise. We are shown a lengthy close-up of Wasicka riffling his chips as he decides what to do. We hear Wasicka speaking. “You can’t have a hand every single time, Jamie . . . Jeez.” About twenty seconds go by, and Wasicka makes the call. The pot is 4,650,000.

“And here’s the flop,” calls out the tournament announcer -- . Wasicka very deliberately taps the felt with an extended finger. Phil Gordon points out how “it wasn’t an instant check . . . he did study it.” Binger reaches forward and pushes in a healthy 3,500,000 chip bet. Close to half of Binger’s chips are now in the pot, so he’s likely committed to go all the way here. Before he can even bring his hands back to his sides, Gold waves back-handedly and says “I’m all-in.”

Wasicka immediately groans and stands up from the table, obviously less than thrilled with Gold’s move. “This is sick,” he says through gritted teeth. Gold loudly cries out “This is it, guys!” “This is sick,” repeats Wasicka. “We all got a hand, let’s do it,” says Gold. “Let’s go all three . . . let’s get it over with, right now.”

Wasicka is fit to be tied. “Are you kidding me?” he says to no one in particular, sitting down and reexamining his cards. He stands again and asks Binger how much he has bet. Gold interrupts saying it doesn’t matter because he’s all-in, but Wasicka objects and Gold backs off. A moment passes and Wasicka again voices his displeasure. “This is disgusting,” he says. Gold nods as if in agreement. His nod evolves into a goose-like bobbing action, then he stands upright and claps his hands. Wasicka folds and Binger instantly calls.

Binger has for top-pair, top-kicker. Gold has for an open-ended straight draw. Gold claps his hands, then shakes Binger’s hand and wishes him good luck. Gordon announces Gold has eight outs, but soon we learn that he actually only has seven. “Paul, You didn’t have the best hand, did you?” Gold calls across the table. “I had the seven-eight of spades,” answers Wasicka. He has folded an open-ended straight flush draw. “Wow,” says Gordon. “I don’t know how you can fold that hand.”

The pot is 26,800,000. “Gimme a spade, at least,” asks Gold. The turn comes -- the . Even better. Gold is hugging Johnny Chan. And Binger is drawing dead.

Binger is smiling and very gracious. He tells a friend he’s curious to see what the river card is, and whether it would have helped Wasicka beat him (if Gold had stayed out of the pot). He walks over to Wasicka and they shake hands. “It’s been a pleasure, man,” says Wasicka. “I’m curious if I would’ve beaten your hand,” says Binger. He’s thinking about what would’ve happened if he had gone all-in first. Would Gold have folded? (Probably not.) If Gold had folded, would Wasicka have called him? “I probably would’ve,” says Wasicka. “One of us has to take [chips], you know.” The now-meaningless river card comes -- . Wasicka would’ve made his flush.

Wasicka wanders around the table with a half-smirk, half-grin on his face as Harrah’s officials set the stage for heads-up play. Within seven hands, Gold will take the rest of the chips (between scoops of blueberries).

II. Wasicka’s decision

Gold’s all-in was bold. It is probably safe to say it altered the outcome of the hand. It arguably sealed his victory for the tournament as well. If Wasicka had made the call with his straight-flush draw, he would’ve won the hand and had around 38 million chips -- not too far from half of the chips in play. Let's forget about that spade on the river for a moment. Should he have called?

If we are talking strictly pot odds, the answer is yes. He need to put 12 million in to win a pot of nearly 27 million -- that’s 3.25-to-1. With a whopping 15 outs for the turn and the river, he’s looking at better than 2-to-1 to hit a winner. If this were a cash game, calling would be a no-brainer.

But this ain’t no cash game. If he calls and wins, terrific. However, if he calls and Gold still wins the hand, the tournament ends right there with Wasicka finishing in second place (since he began the hand with more chips than Binger). If Wasicka calls and Binger wins the hand, he will either be left with 675,000 chips (if his hand beats Gold’s), or will be out right there in third place (if Gold’s hand beats his) -- either way, he’s very likely destined to finish third. So calling could end well or disastrously. But folding also is something of a risk. Folding means either assuring himself at least second place or becoming the short stack by a fairly large margin (he’d be about 15 million behind Binger).

Put yourself in Wasicka’s position. What would you do?

How about this. Let’s say everyone was allowed to turn their cards face up after Gold went all-in. Now put yourself in Wasicka’s position. Let’s say you were even allowed to use CardPlayer's Texas Hold ’em Calculator. You know you’re 53.82% to win the hand. You know Binger is 29.01% to win. You know Gold is 17.17% to win. What would you do?

Here’s where we might actually use some of that game theory stuff we keep hearing people like Chris "Jesus" Ferguson answering questions about but most of us never really pay much heed. (If numbers ain’t yr bag, save yourself some grief and skip now to section III.)

Let’s say you make the call. Over half the time you end up heads-up with nearly half the chips. Let’s also say if that were to occur, you’d have a 50-50 chance of winning the whole ball of wax. About a third of the time you will either finish in third right here or within the next hand or so. Another 1/6 of the time you’ll finish in second place right here. So by calling . . .

-- 27% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $6 million (after losing a heads-up battle or after busting out right here in second)
-- 30% of the time you win $4 million (after busting out right here or soon afterwards in third)

Let’s say you fold. Once you’ve folded, Binger is about 65% to win and Gold 35%. (I can’t be precise here, but that’s about where it stands given Gold has seven available outs plus the backdoor flush draw.) Let’s also say that if Binger wins the hand, 2/3 of the time you’ll end up playing for awhile and getting bounced out in third place. (I say that because he’d have a bit over twice your chips.) And if Gold wins (as happened), let’s make you a 6-to-1 dog to overcome the huge chip lead and somehow win. (I say that because Gold has over 6 times Wasicka’s chips when heads-up begins.) In other words, by folding . . .

-- 5% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 52% of the time you win $6 million (after outlasting Binger and making it to second or after watching Binger lose here and then eventually losing a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $4 million (eventually busting out in third)

Which is the better decision? Isn’t it obvious? (Ha ha.)

Knowing what we know, calling is going to be the more profitable play here. Let’s say we play out this scenario 200 times and we call 100 times and fold 100 times. The 100 times we call, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 27 times = $324 million.
Win $6 million 43 times = $258 million.
Win $4 million 30 times = $120 million.
TOTAL = $702 million or an average of $7.02 million each time.

The 100 times we fold, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 5 times = $60 million.
Win $6 million 52 times = $312 million.
Win $4 million 43 times = $172 million.
TOTAL = $544 million or an average of $5.44 million each time.

Thus, between the two choices, calling is clearly going to be more profitable than folding. So says game theory, anyway . . . .

III. Final thoughts

To be fair to Wasicka, this here experiment assumes full knowledge of everyone’s cards and all of the relevant percentages. Not precisely what happened in real life, to be sure. However, I think it is safe to say Wasicka pretty much knew where he stood when he made the decision. He knew how many chips everyone had. And he knew that all 15 of his outs were probably good. (He could’ve feared a higher spade draw, but I’d be willing to bet that possibility really didn't affect his thinking too greatly when he made his decision to fold.) [EDIT (added 9/18/06): Listening to Wasicka on CardPlayer's The Circuit this week, I discovered that, in fact, he was worried Gold was on a higher flush draw here! So I'd have lost that bet.] So even without knowing that the spade came on the river, Gordon was probably right when he suggested calling was the play to make here.

While it's doubtful Wasicka had all of this worked out to the nearest hundredth of a percentage point, he still knew (I'd argue) that he probably should call. And that he probably wasn’t going to. That’s why he is repeating how “sick” and “disgusting” the situation is. We’ve all been there (though never for these stakes). We know know know what is right, but we just can’t act on that knowledge and the pull the trigger.

In the final hand of the tournament, Wasicka did pull the trigger and make the call of an all-in. Only this time Gold had him beat. As I mentioned before, I’m gonna leave that hand to others to decipher. Watch it here, if you want. Meanwhile, for anyone who’s made it all the way through this monster of a post, it’s been a pleasure . . . .

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 187: Having the Heart to Go Big-Time

Later on in Jim Thompson’s The Getaway, a mix-up in a train station allows a small-timer crook to make off with Doc McCoy's bag full of loot from the bank heist. As McCoy pursues him through the train station, the thief notices the man chasing him isn’t shouting after him as one might expect a robbery victim to do. The small-timer correctly surmises that there must be something in the bag that is preventing him from calling out. “The thief was very cocksure, it should be said; in this particular branch of crime, he had to be. Also -- and it is hardly necessary to point this out -- he had known no criminals of Doc McCoy’s caliber.” Things don’t end well for the small-timer. (Also hardly necessary to point out.)

There were a number of interesting hands prior to Hand No. 187.

There was Hand No. 141 involving Gold and Cunningham. From UTG, Cunningham bet 1 million on a flop of and Gold called from the button. Both checked the turn card, the . Then when the river came , Cunningham bet 2 million and Gold quickly raised all-in. As Cunningham contemplated what to do, Gold stood up and said “Gotcha!” and made like he was ready to turn over his cards. Cunningham had no choice but to fold.

There was Hand No. 155 where Wasicka, as he had done in Hand No. 134, made what appeared to be another sketchy decision. After raising to 1 million UTG, Binger reraised all-in from the button. Wasicka thought for quite a while (nearly three minutes), then called with KQ-off only to see Binger turn over a pair of cowboys. The board didn’t save Wasicka this time, and Binger doubled up.

There was Hand No. 170 in which Gold and Cunningham both called Rhett Butler’s short-stacked all-in, then Gold bet into the dry side pot on a board of . Cunningham folded, Gold showed , and his jacks outlasted Butler’s pocket fours. Butler finished fifth.

So they were four-handed as Hand No. 187 began. Blinds were 150,000/300,000 with a 50,000 ante. Gold had just about exactly 50 million chips, Binger around 14 million, Wasicka 12 million, and Cunningham just over 10 million. Cunningham raised to 800,000 from UTG, Binger folded on the button, Gold called from the small blind, and after a bit of thought Wasicka chose also to call from the big blind. A rare instance of three-way action (at this stage). The pot is 2.6 million.

The flop comes an eyebrow-raising . All three players check fairly quickly. Ali Nejad asks Robert Williamson (the current guest in the booth) why Cunningham didn’t bet that flop. “Suited and coordinated,” explains Williamson. The turn is the . “Somebody might take a stab at this now, with that ace on the turn,” Williamson suggests. Indeed, Wasicka, acting first, bets 1 million. At not even 40% of the pot, Wasicka’s bet is either a simple probe bet to see how the others feel about their hands or a potential trap. Cunningham thinks a moment, pushes out 1 million to call and says he’s going to raise. Even before Cunningham announces the amount of his raise, Gold tosses his cards in the muck.

After some deliberation, Cunningham eventually pushes in 2,975,000 more chips. It isn’t clear why he didn’t put in exactly 3 million for the raise -- it appears from the dealer's tone he might have simply missed grabbing that last 25,000 chip before pushing in. (“I do that on purpose sometimes,” says Williamson.) Gordon and Williamson agree that Cunningham probably has an ace with a high heart kicker.

The pot is now 7,575,000 million and the action is on Wasicka. Gold’s early fold had enabled Wasicka to contemplate his next move for a bit even before Cunningham put in his raise. He waits about twenty seconds then announces he’s all-in. “Wow,” says Williamson. “Oh, my goodness,” says Gordon. It appears neither saw that coming. “Paul must have a heart flush or an ace,” says Williamson. Since Wasicka has him covered, a call would force Cunningham to put in his entire stack. He takes only a moment and then folds.

As the crowd cheers, Wasicka shows his hand -- . No ace. No flush draw. Nothing, really. “That was a big boy bluff right there,” says Gordon. Cunningham smiles sheepishly in appreciation of the play. “Two tens with the ten of hearts,” he says to someone else at the table, revealing what he had held. “Trying to get him to fold a jack.” [EDIT (added 9/28/06): ESPN's edited version of the final table confirms Cunningham indeed held . Gold, incidentally, had .]

Cunningham was a little bit like the thief who stole McCoy’s bag here. For a moment it looked like he might get away with the loot. But he ran into a higher-caliber criminal (on this hand, anyway). Wasicka’s “big boy bluff” looks sick, all right, although if you think about it, Cunningham just about has to have what Gordon and Williamson speculated he did have (an ace with a high heart kicker), or perhaps JJ, to continue with the hand. After the tournament ended, Gold spoke of Wasicka as the one player at the final table he could never figure out. This was probably one of the hands that helped make Wasicka appear more of a "big-time" opponent in Gold's eyes.

This was also probably the hand that determined how both Wasicka and Cunningham would be finishing, securing Cunningham’s eventual exit in fourth place and allowing Wasicka to stick around a bit longer. Winning that pot pushed Wasicka up to 19 million; meanwhile Cunningham had been knocked down to 7 million. Within three hands Cunningham would begin moving all-in repeatedly in a last-ditch attempt to recuperate. On the hand in which Cunningham is finally eliminated -- Hand No. 208 -- he again holds pocket tens, this time losing out to Gold’s after a king flops. (And, as it turned out, Wasicka also loses with pocket tens on the tourney's final hand.)

I have one of my own hands I’d like to solicit advice about in my next post. After that I’ve picked out two more hands from the latter stages of the WSOP final table that seem worth talking about. One of those features a lot of interesting table talk (the best thing about this here pay-per-view, I’ve decided). The other is the hand in which Binger gets eliminated in third. Being a small-timer myself, I’ll be leaving that final hand for commentators of a higher caliber to discuss.

Image: Brach’s Conversation Hearts (adapted), Amazon.

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 134: Friends Don't Let Friends Get Trapped

Early in Jim Thompson’s The Getaway (discussed in the previous post), we read about “Doc” McCoy’s father (as a way of getting to know just what kind of character Doc really is). Thompson explains the elder McCoy’s “code of friendship,” which consists of believing that “a man’s best friend is himself, that a non-friend was anyone who ceased to be useful, and that it was more or less a moral obligation to cash in any persons in this [latter] category, whenever it could be done safely and with no chance of a kickback.”

Such is the attitude that Doc demonstrates in his dealings with others in The Getaway. Others have significance only to the extent that they are useful . . . and if they stop being useful, you get rid of ’em if at all possible. As a matter of moral principle, even.

While despicable in real life, such a ruthless outlook can be enormously beneficial at the poker tables. When your opponent stumbles before you, you don’t stop to help him up. You keep on going, stepping over (or on) him if needed. Poker is first and foremost a self-interested activity. Occasionally a situation arises where one might get richer by indirectly aiding another . . . say when two players check down a hand in which a third short-stacked player is all-in, hoping to bust him and move up a spot in the tourney as a result. For the most part, though, you’re on your own. Old man McCoy’s code is the only one that matters.

I got back to the WSOP final table broadcast and have now made it almost to the end. I’ve picked out a few more hands to discuss, the first being Hand No. 134 (involving Paul Wasicka and Jamie Gold). Now that I’ve made it near the conclusion, it has become increasingly evident to me that while Gold certainly had his share of good cards and draws, his decision-making was more than a little impressive. Gold repeatedly demonstrated at the final table his readiness to “cash in” others whenever the opportunity arose -- an essential trait for the big stack to have in order to succeed.

By this hand -- the last hand at the 120,000/240,000 (plus 40,000 ante) level -- they were down to five-handed. Rhett Butler is shown folding UTG. Wasicka (with about 10 million in chips) then looks down at his cards in the cutoff, sniffs, momentarily rests his head against his closed left fist, and decides to raise to 800,000. Cunningham and Binger quickly fold. Gold (who has something like 52 million) thinks for a moment and calls from the big blind, casually smiling and saying “What cards am I gonna fold?” as he stacks the needed chips to call.

The flop comes . The action is on Gold. He takes another look at his cards, genuinely appearing as though he isn’t sure what exactly he had (and perhaps is checking for diamonds). He checks. Wasicka carefully counts out and places a stack of green chips in the center. “How much?” asks Gold. “1.1 million,” says Wasicka.

Gold is shown in profile rolling his eyes. He then looks at Wasicka for a moment and announces he wants to raise. He puts in the 1.1 million, then says “Another four” (i.e., 4 more million). After pushing in the stacks, Gold leans back in his chair and tosses a few chips back and forth in his hands while looking at Wasicka. Gold again has that dismissive-seeming, “Doc” McCoy-like attitude he’s exhibited so frequently thus far. Wasicka considers a bit, then quietly says he’s all-in. “I gotta call you,” says Gold, standing up. Wasicka cringes, drawing in air through his closed teeth as he sees Gold’s cards -- . With , Wasicka also has top pair, but with a worse kicker. He’s drawing to two tens or a runner-runner straight (AJ or J9). According to CardPlayer’s Texas Hold ’em Odds Calculator, Gold is 81.62% to win the hand.

We hear Gold saying to someone “I just trapped him . . . I’m playing well, right?” The person answers “You’re playing fantastic.” Gold removes his jacket as they await the turn. He’s nodding his head in affirmation of how he played the hand. He leans forward, hands on the edge of the table, and tells the dealer “We’ll take a queen.”

No queen. Rather, the . Not what Gold wanted to see. The crowd -- disproportionately full of Wasicka supporters, it seems -- goes wild. Gold can still win should a jack, queen, or ace appear on the river -- still a 22.73% chance, actually. Gold looks disgusted. “How much better can I play?” he asks someone off to the side. The river is the , and Wasicka survives, taking the nearly 20 million chip pot.

As the crowd noise dies down, Gold sits defiantly with his arms crossed. Again he says “I can’t play any better than that.” Wasicka readily agrees. “You outplayed me,” he says. Gold nods and says “Thank you." Then adds, "Nice hand, though.” A less than sincere afterthought, one imagines. He exhales, stands up, and goes for a short walk around the table.

Civilities aside, it is clear from this hand (and later ones) that Gold had no intention of waiting around for the short stacks to knock each other off. In this instance, he took a mild risk check-calling big slick, but the payoff was (nearly) enormous. At the conclusion of the hand, Gold still had 44 million in chips (with Wasicka now his nearest competitor). In other words, with still about half the chips in play, Gold could well afford to do the dirty work on his own rather than wait for others to help out. And he knew it. He knew that -- at the poker table, at least -- a man’s best friend is himself . . . .

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 60: Riding the Rush?

Before reaching that huge hand between Jamie Gold and Richard Lee I found one other interesting hand involving two of the short stacks. Figures I would. To paraphrase a Chandler short story title, shorts stacks is my business.

On the prior hand, Michael Binger had doubled up through Allen Cunningham thanks to a fortunate draw. Down to about 3 million (7th out of 7), Binger had raised to 700,000 UTG. (The blinds at this level were 100,000/200,000 with a 30,000 ante.) It folded around to Cunningham who called from the big blind. Cunningham checked the QJ8 flop, Binger moved all-in, and Cunningham called with ace-queen. Binger had ace-ten, and luckily for him a king came on the turn, filling his gutshot.

Now comes Hand No. 60. Binger is now the big blind, and his 6 million puts him in 5th place. At this point the seven players have essentially divided into upper and lower divisions, with Gold (37 million), Richard Lee (20 million), and Cunningham (11.5 million) all with large stacks and Douglas Kim, Binger, Rhett Butler, and Paul Wasicka all with short stacks (from 3 to 7 million).

As the hand begins, we watch from overhead as Binger carefully stacks his new chips into a symmetrical arrangement. Doyle Brunson is in the booth answering questions about the H.O.R.S.E. event. It folds around to Paul Wasicka on the button. Wasicka looks at his cards and spends twenty seconds or so counting out part of his chips before announcing he’s all-in. Cunningham folds in the small blind and the action is on Binger.

Binger looks at his cards and it is immediately apparent that whatever he has, he’s not ready to fold it instantly. He scratches his forehead and looks worriedly over in Wasicka’s direction. He rubs his eyes and audibly exhales. He momentarily bends forward and covers both ears with the palms of his hands. In short, he looks like a poor sap who has finally gotten up the gumption to ask his best girl to marry him and she just said let me think about it . . . .

In all, Binger deliberates about 30 seconds or so before finally saying “I call” and turning over his hand -- . Wasicka turns over , and Binger says “damn,” grimacing and shaking his head as if he’s trying to undo what he’s just done. “I can’t believe the ace-nine called here, do you, Doyle?” asks Gordon. (Brunson later says he’d rather have two face cards in that spot, “’cause the other guy figgers to have an ace.”) Nejad correctly notes that even if Wasicka didn’t have an ace here, Binger wouldn’t have been that big of a favorite against any two random cards. All agree the call was a major miscalculation by Binger.

The board comes , and Wasicka has doubled up to 6.7 million or so. Meanwhile Binger has landed right back where he was two hands earlier, in last place with less than 3 million.

Is there any defense for Binger’s play here? Perhaps not. I’ll offer what I think might be a partial explanation, though . . . .

When Wasicka moved all-in from the button, it was the fifth time he’d made a large preflop raise from late position (always from the button or the cutoff). That’s out of eight orbits or so. Binger is in the small blind when Wasicka is in the cutoff seat and in the big blind when Wasicka is on the button, thus making Binger acutely aware of what Wasicka has been doing. Having lost his blinds four times already, Binger had probably already thought to himself that the next time Wasicka pulled that move and he had any kind of hand at all, he’d consider looking him up. The fact that he had just doubled his stack perhaps made him even more eager to entertain the idea (since prior to Hand no. 59 he and Wasicka had been essentially even in chips the entire evening).

I really don’t think Binger was “riding the rush” here and acted recklessly after winning his first big pot of the night. No, I think his call was very likely at least somewhat premeditated. Of course, A9-offsuit is hardly the ideal hand with which for him to have made this play. But we’ve all been there . . . you’ve picked up an opponent’s betting pattern and have convinced yourself precisely how best to exploit it, but when the opportunity comes around certain factors (e.g., other players’ actions, your starting hand, what happened the hand before, etc.) compromise the play. All in all, I’m not faulting Binger too terribly here. Think how hard it would be to make correct decisions with all the various pressures (the money, the cameras, etc.). How’s it go? Living on a lighted stage approaches the unreal for those who think and feel . . . ?

Also worth noting here is how smartly Wasicka appears to have played his short stack during the latter stages of the tourney. Recall he was the player who began day 7 (the next-to-last day) way down in 24th place (out of 27) and managed to claw his way to the final table. While Gold’s successful handling of the big stack is getting most of the attention, Wasicka’s short-stack play during the last two days of the tourney is probably also worth some praise. (I believe I’ve read somewhere how Wasicka somehow managed never once to call a river bet at the final table, but I haven’t checked that out.)

Hand No. 122 coming up.

Image: Rush, Moving Pictures (1981) (adapted), Amazon.