WSOP Final Table Hand No. 229: Split Decision

Okay, one more. All in all, ESPN’s pay-per-view was well done, I’d say. I can’t imagine sitting through the whole thing live, but watching it this way -- in easier-to-digest segments, after the fact -- has been a treat. In fact, as this here post exceeds all reasonable guidelines for length, let me suggest you approach it similarly. Don’t feel obligated to read all at once . . . take it in small chunks, if needed. The discussion comes in three parts: (1) a description of the action; (2) an attempt to assess one of the player’s decisions using game theory; (3) a last reflection.

I. The Action

This is the last hand to feature three players. Jamie Gold has 63,425,000 in chips. Paul Wasicka has 13,325,000. Michael Binger has 12,650,000. The blinds are still 200,000/400,000 (with the 50,000 ante). We watch the action from the bird’s-eye view of the overhead camera. Not following Jesus’s advice for playing the button while three-handed (described in the previous post), Gold limps from the button from over on the right-hand side of the table. On the left, Wasicka calls from the small blind. Binger -- in the middle -- puts in a raise of 1.5 million. Gold pauses and calls Binger’s raise. We are shown a lengthy close-up of Wasicka riffling his chips as he decides what to do. We hear Wasicka speaking. “You can’t have a hand every single time, Jamie . . . Jeez.” About twenty seconds go by, and Wasicka makes the call. The pot is 4,650,000.

“And here’s the flop,” calls out the tournament announcer -- . Wasicka very deliberately taps the felt with an extended finger. Phil Gordon points out how “it wasn’t an instant check . . . he did study it.” Binger reaches forward and pushes in a healthy 3,500,000 chip bet. Close to half of Binger’s chips are now in the pot, so he’s likely committed to go all the way here. Before he can even bring his hands back to his sides, Gold waves back-handedly and says “I’m all-in.”

Wasicka immediately groans and stands up from the table, obviously less than thrilled with Gold’s move. “This is sick,” he says through gritted teeth. Gold loudly cries out “This is it, guys!” “This is sick,” repeats Wasicka. “We all got a hand, let’s do it,” says Gold. “Let’s go all three . . . let’s get it over with, right now.”

Wasicka is fit to be tied. “Are you kidding me?” he says to no one in particular, sitting down and reexamining his cards. He stands again and asks Binger how much he has bet. Gold interrupts saying it doesn’t matter because he’s all-in, but Wasicka objects and Gold backs off. A moment passes and Wasicka again voices his displeasure. “This is disgusting,” he says. Gold nods as if in agreement. His nod evolves into a goose-like bobbing action, then he stands upright and claps his hands. Wasicka folds and Binger instantly calls.

Binger has for top-pair, top-kicker. Gold has for an open-ended straight draw. Gold claps his hands, then shakes Binger’s hand and wishes him good luck. Gordon announces Gold has eight outs, but soon we learn that he actually only has seven. “Paul, You didn’t have the best hand, did you?” Gold calls across the table. “I had the seven-eight of spades,” answers Wasicka. He has folded an open-ended straight flush draw. “Wow,” says Gordon. “I don’t know how you can fold that hand.”

The pot is 26,800,000. “Gimme a spade, at least,” asks Gold. The turn comes -- the . Even better. Gold is hugging Johnny Chan. And Binger is drawing dead.

Binger is smiling and very gracious. He tells a friend he’s curious to see what the river card is, and whether it would have helped Wasicka beat him (if Gold had stayed out of the pot). He walks over to Wasicka and they shake hands. “It’s been a pleasure, man,” says Wasicka. “I’m curious if I would’ve beaten your hand,” says Binger. He’s thinking about what would’ve happened if he had gone all-in first. Would Gold have folded? (Probably not.) If Gold had folded, would Wasicka have called him? “I probably would’ve,” says Wasicka. “One of us has to take [chips], you know.” The now-meaningless river card comes -- . Wasicka would’ve made his flush.

Wasicka wanders around the table with a half-smirk, half-grin on his face as Harrah’s officials set the stage for heads-up play. Within seven hands, Gold will take the rest of the chips (between scoops of blueberries).

II. Wasicka’s decision

Gold’s all-in was bold. It is probably safe to say it altered the outcome of the hand. It arguably sealed his victory for the tournament as well. If Wasicka had made the call with his straight-flush draw, he would’ve won the hand and had around 38 million chips -- not too far from half of the chips in play. Let's forget about that spade on the river for a moment. Should he have called?

If we are talking strictly pot odds, the answer is yes. He need to put 12 million in to win a pot of nearly 27 million -- that’s 3.25-to-1. With a whopping 15 outs for the turn and the river, he’s looking at better than 2-to-1 to hit a winner. If this were a cash game, calling would be a no-brainer.

But this ain’t no cash game. If he calls and wins, terrific. However, if he calls and Gold still wins the hand, the tournament ends right there with Wasicka finishing in second place (since he began the hand with more chips than Binger). If Wasicka calls and Binger wins the hand, he will either be left with 675,000 chips (if his hand beats Gold’s), or will be out right there in third place (if Gold’s hand beats his) -- either way, he’s very likely destined to finish third. So calling could end well or disastrously. But folding also is something of a risk. Folding means either assuring himself at least second place or becoming the short stack by a fairly large margin (he’d be about 15 million behind Binger).

Put yourself in Wasicka’s position. What would you do?

How about this. Let’s say everyone was allowed to turn their cards face up after Gold went all-in. Now put yourself in Wasicka’s position. Let’s say you were even allowed to use CardPlayer's Texas Hold ’em Calculator. You know you’re 53.82% to win the hand. You know Binger is 29.01% to win. You know Gold is 17.17% to win. What would you do?

Here’s where we might actually use some of that game theory stuff we keep hearing people like Chris "Jesus" Ferguson answering questions about but most of us never really pay much heed. (If numbers ain’t yr bag, save yourself some grief and skip now to section III.)

Let’s say you make the call. Over half the time you end up heads-up with nearly half the chips. Let’s also say if that were to occur, you’d have a 50-50 chance of winning the whole ball of wax. About a third of the time you will either finish in third right here or within the next hand or so. Another 1/6 of the time you’ll finish in second place right here. So by calling . . .

-- 27% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $6 million (after losing a heads-up battle or after busting out right here in second)
-- 30% of the time you win $4 million (after busting out right here or soon afterwards in third)

Let’s say you fold. Once you’ve folded, Binger is about 65% to win and Gold 35%. (I can’t be precise here, but that’s about where it stands given Gold has seven available outs plus the backdoor flush draw.) Let’s also say that if Binger wins the hand, 2/3 of the time you’ll end up playing for awhile and getting bounced out in third place. (I say that because he’d have a bit over twice your chips.) And if Gold wins (as happened), let’s make you a 6-to-1 dog to overcome the huge chip lead and somehow win. (I say that because Gold has over 6 times Wasicka’s chips when heads-up begins.) In other words, by folding . . .

-- 5% of the time you win $12 million (after winning a heads-up battle)
-- 52% of the time you win $6 million (after outlasting Binger and making it to second or after watching Binger lose here and then eventually losing a heads-up battle)
-- 43% of the time you win $4 million (eventually busting out in third)

Which is the better decision? Isn’t it obvious? (Ha ha.)

Knowing what we know, calling is going to be the more profitable play here. Let’s say we play out this scenario 200 times and we call 100 times and fold 100 times. The 100 times we call, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 27 times = $324 million.
Win $6 million 43 times = $258 million.
Win $4 million 30 times = $120 million.
TOTAL = $702 million or an average of $7.02 million each time.

The 100 times we fold, here’s how we do:

Win $12 million 5 times = $60 million.
Win $6 million 52 times = $312 million.
Win $4 million 43 times = $172 million.
TOTAL = $544 million or an average of $5.44 million each time.

Thus, between the two choices, calling is clearly going to be more profitable than folding. So says game theory, anyway . . . .

III. Final thoughts

To be fair to Wasicka, this here experiment assumes full knowledge of everyone’s cards and all of the relevant percentages. Not precisely what happened in real life, to be sure. However, I think it is safe to say Wasicka pretty much knew where he stood when he made the decision. He knew how many chips everyone had. And he knew that all 15 of his outs were probably good. (He could’ve feared a higher spade draw, but I’d be willing to bet that possibility really didn't affect his thinking too greatly when he made his decision to fold.) [EDIT (added 9/18/06): Listening to Wasicka on CardPlayer's The Circuit this week, I discovered that, in fact, he was worried Gold was on a higher flush draw here! So I'd have lost that bet.] So even without knowing that the spade came on the river, Gordon was probably right when he suggested calling was the play to make here.

While it's doubtful Wasicka had all of this worked out to the nearest hundredth of a percentage point, he still knew (I'd argue) that he probably should call. And that he probably wasn’t going to. That’s why he is repeating how “sick” and “disgusting” the situation is. We’ve all been there (though never for these stakes). We know know know what is right, but we just can’t act on that knowledge and the pull the trigger.

In the final hand of the tournament, Wasicka did pull the trigger and make the call of an all-in. Only this time Gold had him beat. As I mentioned before, I’m gonna leave that hand to others to decipher. Watch it here, if you want. Meanwhile, for anyone who’s made it all the way through this monster of a post, it’s been a pleasure . . . .

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 218: Honest Abe

Was over on Full Tilt Poker this afternoon and realized there were more playing that $200/$400 Omaha Hi-Lo game (twelve players, including Allen Cunningham) than $0.50/$1.00 limit hold’em (eight players, including your humble servant). Starting to think FTP is a great site for watching, but not so hot for playing . . . at least if yr a short-stack like me. (Ranted about this circumstance once before, actually.)

Speaking of watching poker . . . I have two more hands from the WSOP Main Event Final Table to talk about. I see that ESPN’s edited version of the Main Event has made it through day four so far (six episodes down, six to go). Not sure when exactly they’ll be getting to the final table, but I’ll probably take a peek to see some hole cards on a few of these hands.

By the time we get to this particular hand, they were down to Jamie Gold (nearly 62 million), Paul Wasicka (about 16 million), and Michael Binger (around 12.5 million). The mood around the table has lightened considerably since Cunningham went out. It’s about 3 a.m., so they’ve been at it for eleven hours or so, minus the breaks. Chris “Jesus” Ferguson is now in the booth with Ali Nejad and Phil Gordon answering questions about three-handed play. Ends up delivering a mini-sermon here on the subject. And it was good.

What would Jesus do? Well he’d never limp from the button. Rather, when on the button, he says to raise half the time and fold the other half. He says definitely play any king or ace. When in the small blind, he says to call a third of the time, fold a third of the time, and raise a third of the time.

On Hand No. 217, Gold had raised to 1 million from the button. (The blinds are still 200,000/400,000 with a 50,000 chip ante.) Wasicka folded in the small blind, then Binger moved all-in from the big blind. Instead of deciding on his own what to do next, Gold asked Binger what he wanted him to do.

“It’s fifty-fifty,” Gold explains. “You wanna go all-in fifty-fifty? You tell me . . . call or fold.” Binger smiles nervously. “I don’t know what you have,” he says. “I’m telling you, I don’t have much,” Gold replies. “If I had a big hand, I’d call you in five seconds.” Gold is grinning from ear to ear. Binger asks him “You have a pair or an ace?” Gold slowly blinks, saying “I don’t have a pair.” Finally, after some more hem-and-hawing, Binger says he can’t tell Gold what to do. Gold nods and tosses his cards into the muck.

As the cards are dealt for Hand No. 218, Nejad confidently suggests “Michael Binger is showing that he is unafraid of Jamie Gold.” Nejad is dead wrong, of course. Anyone paying even a little bit of attention can see Binger just now demonstrating that he’s very afraid of Jamie Gold. The man has him outchipped five-to-one, and Binger has little desire to tangle with the chip leader when the difference between second and third place is two million clams.

Binger also seems to be having difficulty figuring out what Gold has from how he’s playing. Case in point: Hand No. 218.

The action moves fairly quickly here until we get to the river. Wasicka folds on the button, Binger raises to 1 million from the SB, and Gold calls from the BB. The flop is . Binger checks, Gold casually throws out a minimum bet of 400,000, and Binger calls. The pot is 2,950,000. The turn is the and both players quickly check. The river is the . Binger checks and Gold casually stacks twelve green chips and pushes them in the middle -- a bet of 1,200,000.

“Ten and jack?” quickly asks Binger. Gold appears amused at the question. He smiles and exhales. There is absolutely zero chance he has a straight here. “I’ll show ya,” says Gold. Binger looks up at the dealer and asks “Can he show me before I make my decision?” The table shares a chuckle.

Then Gold actually flips one card over quickly, briefly exposing it before turning it back down. Binger leans forward in an exaggerated gesture, asking “What was that?’ “I dunno,” Gold shrugs. “Was that the jack of diamonds?” says Binger.

“He can’t do that,” says Gordon. “If the tournament director sees him do that, that is a ten-minute penalty.” The commentators will continue to discuss the violation for the next couple of hands, and while Gold is never assessed any penalty, it ultimately matters very little. Sitting out ten minutes at this juncture would’ve caused Gold to miss at most four or five hands, perhaps six if Binger and Wasicka agreed to fold each hand immediately after it was dealt. That’s two orbits or so -- at most a 1.5 million chip hit to Gold’s massive stack, probably evenly divided between the two short stacks. Not a factor.

The subsequent exchange between Gold and Binger is one of the better examples of table talk in the whole broadcast.

Gold: “You wanna donate, donate.”
Binger: “I’m thinking about it.”
Gold: “I’m probably bluffing, man.”
Binger: “I know.”
Gold: “1.2 million, man . . . . Put it in . . . .”

In the booth, Ferguson says “The bet actually does smell a lot like a bluff.” Gordon agrees. “He’s been Honest Abe so far when he’s talking at the table,” Nejad chimes in.

Binger: “Aye-yi-yi.” (He slaps his hand to his forehead.)
Gold: “I bet small enough so you can call. Then you’ll see my hand.”

Binger takes a moment to calculate pot odds and then compute what percentage of the time Gold would have to be bluffing to justify a call here. You know what I’m talking about. That piece of mental calisthenics you read about in Harrington on Hold ’em but have yet really to implement in your game. The pot is nearly 3 million. Gold bet 1.2 million, so Binger is looking at about 3.5-to-1 odds to call. As Harrington explains, that means Binger needs to be right only once every 4.5 times he calls here to break even. As Binger himself finally concludes, “if you’re bluffing like 20-30% of the time, I gotta call.” “So you’re priced in,” says Gold. “Here you go. Let’s call. Get it over with. You’ll see my hand . . . and . . . rock ‘n roll! I’ll show you either way.”

Binger continues to deliberate. “You got me,” Gold finally confesses. “C’mon!”

Binger folds and Gold immediately shows his . Jack-high. In other words, jack squat.

“Aaaaaugghhh,” cries Binger, doing a nice imitation of Charlie Brown just after Lucy pulls the football away. Again.

[EDIT (added 9/28/06): The hole card cameras on ESPN's edited version of the final table show us Binger indeed folded the best hand -- .]

Binger shakes his head, takes a swig from his water bottle, slaps the padded table edge, and tells Gold good hand. “I told you you got me,” says Gold. “I’m having fun. Easy for me to say, with a stack like this . . . .”

Gold’s having fun, all right. So is the viewer. (Good thing, too, since the outcome has been all but decided.) A great example, really, of where the live broadcast beats the edited version.

Okay, one more hand (Hand No. 229) and we can get on with our lives. Meanwhile, I’ll be railing that crazy Omaha Hi-Lo game on FTP . . . .

Photo: “The first 1953 $5 Silver Certificate printed (Smithsonian)” (inset), National Museum of American History. Public Domain.

Testing, Testing . . .

You’re in a limit game and are dealt in the big blind. It folds around to the cutoff who calls. The button folds, the small blind completes, and you check your option. So there are three of you in when the flop comes . The small blind checks. What do you do?

This is a situation that comes up frequently enough to warrant some consideration. You find yourself barely committed to a hand, then a flop comes that changes everything. Like you’d been laying low, trying to figure out where the buffet line begins, when all of sudden you’ve been asked to deliver a toast to the happy couple. Now you’re the center of attention. You are expected to speak. But what are you going to say?

Do you bet? For as long as I can remember this was an automatic bet for me. I know that flopping a flush is a statistical rarity. For the guy holding two suited cards, he’s flopping a flush something like 1 out of 118 times. In fact, if three diamonds come out like this, it is more likely than not neither of my two opponents holds a single diamond. Of course, if one does have a diamond, he’s probably going to be sticking around for the turn (especially if that diamond isn’t especially low).

So it’s very likely -- almost a certainty, really -- that I’m ahead. And there are big draws out there, flush and straight. So I gotta protect, right?

Like I said, in the past, I would always bet. If the fourth diamond came on the turn, I’d often weakly remain in the hand (by check-calling) in the hopes of filling up on the river (even if pot odds weren’t quite enough to warrant sticking around). In other words, I hated letting go of my flopped two pair, and so often ended up paying off my drawing opponent when they didn’t hold up.

The other day, though, I was in this very situation and decided to do something different. I checked. And when the cutoff bet and the small blind folded, I just called. I figured if anyone was on a draw, he wasn’t folding to my open bet on the flop, nor would a check-raise likely scare him away. Pessimistic, I know . . . but I’d made up my mind that I didn’t want to lose a lot on this hand. I thought I’d try to keep the pot small and see what the turn brought.

The turn was the . No straight. No flush. My top two pair was still the best hand, I was sure. I checked and as I’d hoped the cutoff bet. I check-raised, and he called me. The river was the . I bet, he folded, and I took the pot of $6.20 (giving up thirty cents to the rake).

I don’t know what my opponent had, but clearly he didn’t have a queen. He likely had a diamond. And he may even have let go of bottom or middle pair. Of course, if he had flopped the flush (or made a set), I was doomed. But he didn’t, and I wasn’t. As it happened, I’d probably extracted the most I possibly could have from this particular hand.

I looked back in Miller/Sklansky/Malmuth’s Small Stakes Hold ’em to see if there were any sort of justification for how I’d played the hand. It had felt right to me, and (of course) the result made me think I’d done well here.

Speaking of “Slowplaying,” the trio point out that it is never a good idea to risk large pots by slowplaying. (I hadn’t done that.) But they don’t recommend giving free cards with draws on the board, either. (I had done that.)

However, in the section about “Protecting Your Hand,” they describe situations where a post-flop raise will not protect your hand. One example involves being in the big blind and flopping two pair with straight and flush draws on the board (e.g., you have T8 and the flop comes QT8 with two hearts). “If you raise now,” they explain, your opponents “will often call anyway,” particularly when there are multiple players still involved. “The best plan is to call now, hoping for a safe card. If fourth street is a blank, plan to check-raise then.” This was precisely the plan I had followed in the hand (although I wasn’t necessarily conscious of any theoretical basis for playing it this way).

Does the math support the play? Doesn’t seem to, really. When I check-raised the turn, my opponent faced 4.5-to-1 pot odds to call; thus, he was certainly justified to call if indeed he was hoping to complete his flush (around 4-to-1 to hit). However, a bet on the flop wouldn’t have been much better, odds-wise. If I had bet, the cutoff would’ve had 4-to-1 to call (and surely would’ve, if he’s chasing that flush). If I had check-raised the flop, the cutoff would’ve had 6-to-1 to call . . . even better.

So it seems like waiting until the turn indeed maximized my profit, although it also maximized my potential loss had my opponent made his draw. Still, I’m over 80% to win after that turn card -- a good place to be with one card to come, no matter how you look at it.

Did I stumble my way into a viable strategy for this kind of situation? What do you say? Here . . . take this microphone . . . I’m gonna go see if there are any of those little shrimp thingys left . . . .

WSOP Final Table Hand No. 187: Having the Heart to Go Big-Time

Later on in Jim Thompson’s The Getaway, a mix-up in a train station allows a small-timer crook to make off with Doc McCoy's bag full of loot from the bank heist. As McCoy pursues him through the train station, the thief notices the man chasing him isn’t shouting after him as one might expect a robbery victim to do. The small-timer correctly surmises that there must be something in the bag that is preventing him from calling out. “The thief was very cocksure, it should be said; in this particular branch of crime, he had to be. Also -- and it is hardly necessary to point this out -- he had known no criminals of Doc McCoy’s caliber.” Things don’t end well for the small-timer. (Also hardly necessary to point out.)

There were a number of interesting hands prior to Hand No. 187.

There was Hand No. 141 involving Gold and Cunningham. From UTG, Cunningham bet 1 million on a flop of and Gold called from the button. Both checked the turn card, the . Then when the river came , Cunningham bet 2 million and Gold quickly raised all-in. As Cunningham contemplated what to do, Gold stood up and said “Gotcha!” and made like he was ready to turn over his cards. Cunningham had no choice but to fold.

There was Hand No. 155 where Wasicka, as he had done in Hand No. 134, made what appeared to be another sketchy decision. After raising to 1 million UTG, Binger reraised all-in from the button. Wasicka thought for quite a while (nearly three minutes), then called with KQ-off only to see Binger turn over a pair of cowboys. The board didn’t save Wasicka this time, and Binger doubled up.

There was Hand No. 170 in which Gold and Cunningham both called Rhett Butler’s short-stacked all-in, then Gold bet into the dry side pot on a board of . Cunningham folded, Gold showed , and his jacks outlasted Butler’s pocket fours. Butler finished fifth.

So they were four-handed as Hand No. 187 began. Blinds were 150,000/300,000 with a 50,000 ante. Gold had just about exactly 50 million chips, Binger around 14 million, Wasicka 12 million, and Cunningham just over 10 million. Cunningham raised to 800,000 from UTG, Binger folded on the button, Gold called from the small blind, and after a bit of thought Wasicka chose also to call from the big blind. A rare instance of three-way action (at this stage). The pot is 2.6 million.

The flop comes an eyebrow-raising . All three players check fairly quickly. Ali Nejad asks Robert Williamson (the current guest in the booth) why Cunningham didn’t bet that flop. “Suited and coordinated,” explains Williamson. The turn is the . “Somebody might take a stab at this now, with that ace on the turn,” Williamson suggests. Indeed, Wasicka, acting first, bets 1 million. At not even 40% of the pot, Wasicka’s bet is either a simple probe bet to see how the others feel about their hands or a potential trap. Cunningham thinks a moment, pushes out 1 million to call and says he’s going to raise. Even before Cunningham announces the amount of his raise, Gold tosses his cards in the muck.

After some deliberation, Cunningham eventually pushes in 2,975,000 more chips. It isn’t clear why he didn’t put in exactly 3 million for the raise -- it appears from the dealer's tone he might have simply missed grabbing that last 25,000 chip before pushing in. (“I do that on purpose sometimes,” says Williamson.) Gordon and Williamson agree that Cunningham probably has an ace with a high heart kicker.

The pot is now 7,575,000 million and the action is on Wasicka. Gold’s early fold had enabled Wasicka to contemplate his next move for a bit even before Cunningham put in his raise. He waits about twenty seconds then announces he’s all-in. “Wow,” says Williamson. “Oh, my goodness,” says Gordon. It appears neither saw that coming. “Paul must have a heart flush or an ace,” says Williamson. Since Wasicka has him covered, a call would force Cunningham to put in his entire stack. He takes only a moment and then folds.

As the crowd cheers, Wasicka shows his hand -- . No ace. No flush draw. Nothing, really. “That was a big boy bluff right there,” says Gordon. Cunningham smiles sheepishly in appreciation of the play. “Two tens with the ten of hearts,” he says to someone else at the table, revealing what he had held. “Trying to get him to fold a jack.” [EDIT (added 9/28/06): ESPN's edited version of the final table confirms Cunningham indeed held . Gold, incidentally, had .]

Cunningham was a little bit like the thief who stole McCoy’s bag here. For a moment it looked like he might get away with the loot. But he ran into a higher-caliber criminal (on this hand, anyway). Wasicka’s “big boy bluff” looks sick, all right, although if you think about it, Cunningham just about has to have what Gordon and Williamson speculated he did have (an ace with a high heart kicker), or perhaps JJ, to continue with the hand. After the tournament ended, Gold spoke of Wasicka as the one player at the final table he could never figure out. This was probably one of the hands that helped make Wasicka appear more of a "big-time" opponent in Gold's eyes.

This was also probably the hand that determined how both Wasicka and Cunningham would be finishing, securing Cunningham’s eventual exit in fourth place and allowing Wasicka to stick around a bit longer. Winning that pot pushed Wasicka up to 19 million; meanwhile Cunningham had been knocked down to 7 million. Within three hands Cunningham would begin moving all-in repeatedly in a last-ditch attempt to recuperate. On the hand in which Cunningham is finally eliminated -- Hand No. 208 -- he again holds pocket tens, this time losing out to Gold’s after a king flops. (And, as it turned out, Wasicka also loses with pocket tens on the tourney's final hand.)

I have one of my own hands I’d like to solicit advice about in my next post. After that I’ve picked out two more hands from the latter stages of the WSOP final table that seem worth talking about. One of those features a lot of interesting table talk (the best thing about this here pay-per-view, I’ve decided). The other is the hand in which Binger gets eliminated in third. Being a small-timer myself, I’ll be leaving that final hand for commentators of a higher caliber to discuss.

Image: Brach’s Conversation Hearts (adapted), Amazon.