Talkin’ Teamwork

Still enjoying some down time here as the year comes to a close. Mostly lazing about reading some, writing some, and watching a lot of hoops on the teevee.

After indulging in that NBA marathon on Christmas day -- a quintuple-header’s worth of games of which I watch parts of all five -- I tuned in last night to watch my Charlotte Bobcats lose their 16th straight game, this one to the Miami Heat. The Boobcats (as Vera and I like to call them) did cut Miami’s lead to two about halfway through the fourth quarter, but in truth the outcome was never in doubt. Was sort of like watching a big brother playing against a little brother, only trying enough to ensure the victory.

Of course, last season Charlotte had a record-setting year for woefulness, going a miserable 7-59 to set a new standard for lowest winning percentage ever. This year began promisingly, with the ’Cats equaling that total of seven wins in the first dozen games, racing out to a 7-5 mark. But they’re now 7-21, and if they lose a few more talk will surface regarding whether or not they’ll exceed that 23-game losing streak with which they concluded the 2011-12 season.

Since I live in the Bobcats’ market, I end up getting to see a lot of their games and thus have probably spent more time than most contemplating the causes for their mediocrity. Talent-wise, they’re well obviously behind most other teams, lacking at pretty much every position. But while each player is often a step behind his counterpart in a given game, the Charlotte team often seems not to work together especially well either, which tends to make the whole feel that much less than the sum of the parts.

The inability to work together is most obvious on the offensive end, where plays are constantly breaking down prior to a decent shot being attempted. There was an article in the Charlotte Observer just a few days ago documenting how the “Shot clock has become Bobcats’ worst enemy.” They lead the league in shot-clock violations (by a lot), and Bobcats beat writer Rick Bonnell offers several theories for why the team has so much trouble working together to get a shot off.

Basketball is a game that often rewards players being able to work together effectively, whether by passing well, creating good spacing, or just understanding and fulfilling given roles in an effective way. It reminds me a little of a game like Omaha in which you want the four cards in your hand to “work together” (so to speak), complementing each other in a way that gives you the greatest chance for success. And having just one “dangler” or odd card that doesn’t really fit with the other three can significantly lessen the potential of the entire hand.

Part of me wants to single out Gerald Henderson as the Bobcats’ “dangler,” actually. Although he’s ostensibly one of the top three or so players on the squad, it seems like at times the team functions less well when he’s part of the mix. I suppose one could analyze various stats to help support or disprove the idea, but the fact is the ’Cats have done a lot worse overall when he’s played than when he hasn’t. This year they’re 6-8 with Henderson out of the line-up, and 1-13 when he plays. (They were also 1-7 in the preseason, when he played every game.)

Then again, it’s probably putting a little much on Henderson’s shoulders to pursue such a theory, as there’s a lot else to complain about when it comes to the team’s failure to function. Still, as a Bobcats fan, it would be nice to stop getting dealt crap hands like over and over again.

Welcome to Omaha

Tried to log onto Full Tilt today and couldn’t connect to the site. If you go over to the FTP website and look under “24/7 Support,” they have a tab for “System Status.” I took a peek there and saw the message “We are currently performing scheduled maintenance to increase our server capacity in order to handle increased traffic. Please check back soon!” So I assume all is well. Have to say, though, now that the UIGEA has become law, I have a slight apprehension whenever I log on to play that one day I simply won’t be able to access a site. Not sure what recourse I would have should that occur.

Hopefully I’ll be able to get back onto FTP later this week for Event No. 7 of the Ante-Up Intercontinental Poker Series -- Pot Limit Omaha HL (scheduled for Thursday night). Have been brushing up a bit on Omaha here lately. There was a time when I exclusively played Omaha (High only), but it has been awhile. Was never completely up on how to play the split pot version, but I’m reviewing some of the basics in the hopes of not embarrassing myself on Thursday.

Not that long ago I picked up a copy of Bill Boston’s book, Omaha High-Low. Now I knew even before I got it that this wasn’t the best book from which to learn Omaha. Boston’s book has been around for a while -- fifteen years, I think -- with this newly-expanded version coming out just in the last month or so. I’d always been curious about it, mainly because the book includes a massive table that ranks what it calls “all 5,278 Omaha High-Low hands.” So when I found a cheaply-priced copy of the 2006 edition, I went ahead and picked it up.

Boston’s book has a number of serious problems, I’m afraid. There are some decent tips here and there regarding hand selection, but the book as a whole suffers mightily in several ways. It’s focus is hopelessly narrow. Boston’s so-called “research methodology” is seriously flawed. It contains quite a bit of unclear and/or misleading information. And it is badly written and edited. (If these things don’t matter to you, though, it’s terrific . . . !) Let me explain.

First off, Boston is only interested in fixed limit Omaha High-Low, so forget about learning anything here about the pot limit game. Also, just about all of his energy is focused on hand selection. There are cursory chapters about playing the turn and river, but neither of these include any but the most obvious advice, really. The chapter on playing the turn reminds us that at this point having the nuts usually isn’t sufficient -- i.e., we often need to have draws and redraws to continue. The chapter on the river seems to discount its own reason for being in the book at all, given that Boston’s basic advice is “At the river, you either make a hand and stay, or you fold -- it’s as simple as that.” Simple, indeed. There’s also a brief chapter about reading opponents in which Boston appears to have borrowed some of Hellmuth’s animal types to make yet another ambiguous, vague point. (I could be wrong, but I do think this latter chapter was one that didn’t appear in the original edition.)

The fact is, Boston isn’t really interested in considering Omaha High-Low in ways that are not mathematically-based. The main focus of the book is the chart ranking 5,278 hands that occupies two-thirds of its length. He arrived at the chart by running simulations using Wilson Software’s Turbo Omaha High-Low Split program. He says he ran at least 100,000 simulations per starting hand, and up to 2 million simulations for hands containing an ace. (He doesn’t explain why he ran more simulations for some hands than for others.) Additionally, in the Wilson program he identified the player playing these hands as “tight,” meaning that the player would only select the best starting hands to play.

Right from the get-go one can see how Boston’s methodology is hopelessly skewed -- rather than run an “objective” simulation that would compare starting hands against one another, Boston already is imposing a different, unspecified criteria (the one followed by Wilson’s “tight” player) before running his simulations.

There are further problems, here. Boston only divides starting hands into three categories: double-suited, suited, and non-suited. “Non-suited” is obvious enough -- you have four cards of different suits. “Double-suited” is defined as the two highest pocket cards being suited with the two lowest. Fine. However, Boston defines a “suited” hand as one in which the highest pocket card is suited with one other card. The problem is, Boston doesn’t bother to clarify whether or not that hand might contain a third and/or fourth card of that same suit. Obviously one is going to be less inclined to gun for a flush if one is already holding four of the desired suit in one’s hand.

In fact, reading through the text and noting all of his examples, Boston appears completely unaware (or unconcerned) that one could be dealt a hand with three or four of the same suit. This omission reminds me a bit of a book on Hold ’em odds written by a probability expert that I once read in which the author went ahead and provided the odds not just for 2-10 players, but on up to 23 players. In that case, it seemed clear the author hadn’t played much Hold ’em. Boston does play Omaha, however, and so there’s no explanation for his having missed this important point.

That “5,278 hands” figure is misleading, then. There are more possible starting hands than that. The table nevertheless remains interesting to consider. One sees clearly how the rankings underscore the importance of having four cards that “work together,” as well as the importance of scoop potential. (Incidentally, the best Omaha hand according to Boston is A-A-2-3, double-suited. The worst? 2-2-2-2.)

Finally, Boston really needs an editor (if not a ghost writer). Redundancies abound, as do blatant howlers that even a novice Omaha player like me can spot. Not once but twice does Boston confidently claim that “It is impossible to be dealt four cards that can not [sic] make a straight, flush, or full-house.” Huh? Try to make a flush with a non-suited hand. Try to make a straight with 2-2-2-2. [EDIT (added 10/28/06): After rereading that sentence ten more times or so, I finally see how it is intended -- that every hand in Omaha High/Low can make at least one of those three. Still, confusing.] Boston’s point here -- indeed, his basic thesis (reiterated endlessly) -- is that because there are so many possible hand combinations out there, one needs to be very cautious when choosing hands to play. The point would’ve been a lot more convincing, though, without the incorrect [EDIT (added 10/28/06): or, rather, potentially misleading] claims.

Can anyone recommend any of the other Omaha books? I've seen books like Mark Tenner and Lou Krieger’s Winning Omaha/8 Poker, Mike Cappelletti's How to Win at Omaha High-Low Poker, and Ray Zee’s book High-Low-Split Poker, Seven-Card Stud and Omaha Eight-or-better for Advanced Players all receive favorable reviews. Any suggestions?

I’ll probably be putting Boston’s book back on the shelf Thursday night while I play in the tourney. Provided I can log on, that is.

Image: Omaha Hi-Low (2006), Bill Boston, Amazon.