What’s the Plan, Man?

I continue to play a lot of pot-limit Omaha. Such a fun game. Sometimes referred to as a “post-flop” game, because so much of what matters indeed happens after the flop. Good game for those who enjoy making plans.

These days, I am almost entirely on PokerStars when I play, where I am still not too far off the pace to reach Gold Star status this month. I’d become ambivalent about doing so a week or so ago, but discover today that I’ve put in enough hands for it to be not too difficult for me to get there by month’s end.

The main benefit, as far as I can tell, will be getting 2 FPPs (Frequent Player Points) for every VPP (VIP Player Point) I earn while my Gold Star status lasts (i.e., through the end of September). I would also gets Gold Star-level access to purchase certain items in the VIP store with FPPs, which would be more meaningful for me if I had more FPPs in my account currently (I’m only sitting on around 4,200 right now). I could perhaps play a bunch next month, accumulate more FPPs, then see what I could buy, although I couldn’t even come close to the 25,000 by the end of next month I’d need to buy a $300 VIP Reward Bonus.

Otherwise, Gold Star appears pretty similar to Silver Star as far as the daily and weekly freerolls go. I would get a free entry into the $100,000 guaranteed monthly freeroll in September, something that as a Silver Star would require winning my seat via a 130 FPP satellite. As a Gold Star, I could also buy my way into some of the larger tourneys (i.e., $320 and up) with FPPs, but I’m more likely to go for cash bonuses than to do that.

I might just go ahead and try to make the Gold Star this month, grab up some extra FPPs during September, then perhaps think about going for Gold Star again in October, as that would let me try to win a seat (via an FPP satellite) in the big Quarterly VIP tourney in November, a $1 million guaranteed tourney.

As you can see, I didn’t necessarily think ahead too well with this here Gold Star plan, although one nice side benefit has been I’ve been doing okay at the tables. Putting in the extra hands has kind of jump-started the year for me, and gotten me thinking a lot more about my game and ways to improve.

Speaking of planning ahead, I had a PLO hand last week that reminded me of how it is sometimes important in certain hands to think about betting on future streets when making that first bet after the flop. This is something that good no-limit hold’em players are always thinking about, but for a guy like me who generally plays a lot of fixed limit betting games, the concept isn’t always foremost in my mind.

I’ve found myself most often playing the “20-50 BB” version of the $0.10/$0.25 PLO games (six-handed), meaning the maximum buy-ins are $12.50. Of course, even 50 big blinds isn’t a lot. Let’s say I’ve just bought in and play a hand in which there’s a raise and two players call. The pot will then be about $2.50, and I’ll be down to $11.65 -- about 4.5 times the pot. I’m already down to a point where I only have a couple of pot-sized bets left!

By the way, Jeff Hwang spells all of this out nicely in his Advanced Pot-Limit Omaha, Volume I: Small-Ball and Short-Handed Play (2009) where he applies that “Stack-to-Pot Ratio” idea (SPR) that Matt Flynn, Sunny Mehta, and Ed Miller talk about in Professional No-Limit Hold’em (2007) to PLO. Hwang points out that SPR is probably even more useful to be aware of in PLO where pot-limit restrictions on betting apply.

There Hwang explains how having an SPR of 4 essentially means you are down to two pot-sized bets (with the second one being about three times the first one). Not a lot of room, really, for planning ahead, but there do come situations where it is good to put a little thought into how the second bet will go when make that first one.

I’m going to simplify the hand somewhat -- modifying the stack sizes just a touch -- to try and make the ’splainin’ easier. Let’s just say I bought in for $12.50 and after an orbit or so I’ve slipped to exactly $10.00. And we’ll give everyone else around the table at least $10.00, too, so the effective stacks (as far as I’m concerned) are all ten bucks.

In this hand I was under the gun and was dealt . I wanted to see a flop cheaply, if possible, so I limped in for a quarter. It folded to the button who raised pot to $1.10. The small blind folded, the big blind called, and I called as well. That made the pot $3.40 going to the flop. I had just $8.90 left -- an SPR of a little over 2.6. The flop then came , giving me a straight.

Hwang has a table called “SPR Considerations: All-in Considerations on the Flop” in which he offers some suggestions about whether or not one should be willing to get the whole stack in or not on various flops, as indicated by one’s SPR.

Flopping the bare nut straight with no redraw is a sketchy situation when the stacks are deep -- indeed, Hwang says if your SPR is more than 13 (i.e., more than three pot-sized bets heads-up), then “No Way” should you be wanting to get your whole stack in here. But if your SPR is less than 4 -- like mine is here -- then Hwang’s answer to the question of whether or not to commit on the flop is “OK.”

Actually, I do have a redraw here -- I can improve from a nine-high straight to a ten-high straight -- so I’m pretty ready to go for it. If I bet and get raised, I’ll shove and hope my hand holds. Obviously it’s bad for me if he has a straight plus a flush draw and is freerolling, but so it goes.

So here’s what happened: I bet the pot ($3.40), and only the button called. Pot now $10.20. The turn was the , I bet my last $5.50, and the button quickly called, showing (not a hand I’d be too excited about even from late position in PLO). I suppose he might’ve thought the deuce gave him more straight outs, though those were no good. The river brought the , and my hand had held up.

Afterwards, I considered how vulnerable I’d left myself following that pot-sized flop bet. My Stack-to-Pot Ratio was down to just 0.5 at that point. Even worse, I was out of position, meaning I wasn’t in a good spot to know if a spade or pairing card helped my opponent or not.

If a third spade had come on the turn, I might have been able to check-fold, and subsequently would’ve felt a little bummed about dumping half my stack. And if the board had paired, I might have gone ahead and bet my $5.50, hoping he was on the flush draw and hadn’t improved. In any event, I’ve left myself so little behind I’ve made life a little awkward going forward.

What if, I thought, I had only bet, say, $2.00 on that flop (about 60%) of the pot? Am pretty sure the button still would’ve just called, and the big blind probably still would’ve folded. That would’ve made the pot $7.40, and I would’ve had $6.90 left -- almost a pot-sized bet. Then comes the safe turn card and my all-in shove, and if my opponent was indeed drawing to ten outs or less (as I assumed he was) he’d be making a worse river call, odds-wise. I guess I’d also feel less committed should a scary turn card come, and more easily able to get away from the hand.

In those spots in which my opponent on the button is going to raise my flop bet there, it doesn’t matter if I bet $2.00 or $3.40 -- I can reraise with the rest of my stack, either way. But if he’s just going to call as he did, I think the less-than-pot-sized bet is probably preferable.

Like I say, I think the good no-limit hold’em players have all long ago absorbed this here bet-sizing thing and instinctively know what amounts work best when it comes to setting up later-street betting.

And the best NLHE tourney players -- often even more mindful of stack sizes than are cash game players -- are especially good at this sort of planning ahead, able to set up opponents to commit entire stacks in unfavorable situations time and again.

Yet another area in poker in which could stand to study more and try to improve.

Yeah, I say that. One can always plan.

To Pot or Not to Pot, a PLO Predicament

A couple of weeks ago I moved back over to pot-limit Omaha (from limit hold’em) and have been once again enjoying the game I focused on primarily for the latter half of ’07 and all of ’08. Part of what got me back over onto the PLO tables was reading Jeff Hwang’s new one, Advanced Pot-Limit Omaha, Volume I: Small Ball and Short-Handed Play -- one of the best written, most helpful strategy texts I’ve read in some time.

I’m a big fan of Hwang’s first book, titled Pot-Limit Omaha Poker: The Big Play Strategy, the first half of which focuses on PLO (the rest concentrates on limit Omaha/8 and PLO8). That first book does a terrific job explaining how to think about PLO, and is particularly valuable (I think) in its discussion of starting hand constructions and what Hwang calls “straight draw physics.” For newcomers, it is essential to understand that while there isn’t that huge of a difference between a lot of starting hands preflop, certain hands have a much, much better chance of connecting with the flop than others, and thus there really is a lot to think about when it comes to selecting which hands to play.

The second book neatly follows the first with discussions of various “advanced” plays and concepts. One need not have read the first book to pick up the new one, but it would help to have had some experience with PLO and a basic understanding of why, say, is a better starter than . Or other basic concepts such as the supreme importance of position or knowing that having a couple of aces in your hand ain’t the cat’s pajamas the way it is in hold’em.

I’m not going to delve into a full-fledged review here, but I will say I like Hwang’s new one very much and recommend it highly. Rather, I just wanted to pose a quick question regarding PLO strategy that comes up in Advanced Pot-Limit Omaha, Volume I with which I’ve struggled occasionally.

Early on, Hwang discusses how in PLO the pot-sized bet is frequently chosen -- especially preflop, on the flop, and even on the turn -- when a player is opening the betting. “Generally speaking,” writes Hwang, “unless the board is paired or a possible flush is present, the standard bet on the flop and turn is a full-sized bet. That said, more often than not, a bet in the neighborhood of half- or three-quarters of the pot in these spots is a sign of weakness, amounting to little more than a weak attempt to pick up the pot.”

In many of Hwang’s hand examples whenever an opponent makes a less-than-pot-sized bet it is often described as a “weak stab” -- even if the bet is 75% of the pot or more. These bets then become invitations to play back by “floating” or check-raising or otherwise doing something to take the initiative away from the opponent and (hopefully) claim the pot.

Now, I’m kind of generalizing here -- I don’t mean to suggest Hwang is always regarding less-than-pot-sized bets as “weak” -- but I wanted to present one of his hand examples and ask you what you think about the situation.

In this hand, Hwang is playing from the big blind, but there’s a “Mississippi Straddle” (on the button), meaning preflop action starts with the small blind. The blinds are $5/$10, and the straddle is $25. Hwang is dealt . The small blind folds, Hwang completes, then a player in EP raises to $75. Two players call, including the button, and Hwang calls as well.

Never mind the straddle business -- this is a situation that comes up fairly frequently. You’re in the blinds and get a neat-looking, double-suited hand with some straight potential and a small pair in it, and you want to play it, even though you’re out of position. So you end up in a hand like this where a pot has already been built up a bit and there are four of you seeing a flop -- and you’re there in the worst position, having to act first on every street from this point forward.

Hwang is self-deprecating about his decision to play the hand -- indeed, one of the things I like most about Hwang’s books is his willingness to admit having made errors or less-than-ideal plays here and there (and the humor he uses when pointing out such mistakes). “I am about to get what I deserved,” says Hwang as he readies for the flop, “ -- a marginal situation.”

The flop comes , giving Hwang a bottom set of fours. He says he doesn’t want to bet out and be forced to fold if raised, so he checks. The others check to the button who bets $250 into the $305 pot. Hwang characterizes this less-than-pot-sized bet as a “weak stab.”

One little side issue, here: If the button had bet just $55 more (the pot), is it that much different? Is it no longer a “weak” bet? I wonder about this sometimes, as I notice in my PLO25 games sometimes if I bet even a nickel less than the pot it seems like I am much more likely to get called (or raised) than if I bet the entire pot. (Which is what I desire, sometimes.)

Note, the button wasn’t the preflop raiser, so this isn’t technically a c-bet. But given the not-so-coordinated board (no flush draw, a possible straight draw) and the apparent invitation to claim the pot when the other three checked, Hwang doesn’t really think much of the button’s bet. He notes the stack sizes (most in the $2,000 range), then decides to check-raise the pot to $1,055. All fold.

So here’s my question. I’ve been in this same situation frequently, and sometimes I’ve played it exactly the same way. (Of course, you can divide the total amounts in Hwang’s example by 50 or so, lol.) I understand why calling is awful here -- you can’t give the straight draws odds and you don’t want to let the pot get bigger and bigger while playing from out of position.

But what troubles me here is the idea of betting $1,055 to win $505.

Readers of Harrington on Hold’em instinctively recall his advice about c-betting half the pot and how the move only has to work once every three times for you to break even. I realize we’re looking at an entirely different situation (and game) here, but in this case Hwang is betting twice the size of the pot -- and really, really doesn’t want callers, preferring to take it down right here. So it seems like the move has to work almost all of the time to be profitable. Because when it doesn’t -- say, when the button (or one of the other players) comes back over the top with a bigger set -- you’re likely playing for the rest of your stack, and also likely in sad shape when putting the rest of your money in the middle.

I say I recognize the situation and have experienced it before -- what I mean is I’ve played hands where I’ve made a bold pot-sized raise after the flop, won the hand, then, when looking at my stack afterwards, thought to myself “is that all?” Because I’ve put a lot of chips at risk to win what amounts to a relatively small pot.

Anyhow, I guess the real advice here is to avoid these “marginal” situations if you can. As Hwang himself states at the start of the “Advanced Concepts” section of his new book, “The true mark of an expert player is not the ability to maneuver in tight spots, but rather the ability to avoid putting himself into tight spots to begin with.”

If anyone has thoughts about this situation, I’d love to hear ’em. Like I say, for those of you thinking about moving over to PLO, I greatly recommend both of Hwang’s books.

Have a great weekend, all.